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1.Mathematical Interpretation  
a) Hermeneutics of the Pythagorean theorem 
In his (1883) and a number of later writings W. Dilthey urges the autonomy of 
humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) from natural sciences (Naturswissenschaften). 
Dilthey’s principle argument is methodological: objecting against attempts of Compte 
and Mill to extend scientific methods to moral, political and other humanities issues 
Dilthey purports to constitute the autonomy of humanities by providing them with a 
proper methodology independent from that of natural sciences.  An important role in the 
Dilthey’s methodology of humanities plays his notion of hermeneutic understanding, i.e. 
an understanding achieved through an interpretation, which Dilthey distinguishes from 
understanding achieved through a scientific explanation. As it has been noticed already 
by Husserl (1954) and recently stressed by Brown (1991), Crease (1997) and Salanskis 
(1991) hermeneutic issues are in fact not less important in natural sciences and 
mathematics than in humanities. A straightforward evidence of the relevance of 
understanding through interpretation in mathematics comes from the usual school 
practice: what counts as a genuine understanding (as opposed to mechanical memorising) 
of a given mathematical fact by a pupil is his or her capacity to formulate and prove it in 
his or her “own words” and apply it in a new unexpected situation. Obviously in a 
research environment the variability of forms of expressions of mathematical contents is 
even higher.  
How this variability allows for a stable translatable mathematical content (meaning) and 
how precisely this phenomenon can be described?  I think that this question has been so 
far very little studied. The question is not really specific for mathematics and can be 
easily reformulated as a problem of general theory of meaning. However the case of 
mathematical meaning is particularly important because in this case one can easier see 
how to treat the problem by rigorous mathematical methods. As far as the problem is 
solved inside mathematics one can think about application of the obtained mathematical 
solution elsewhere.  
It might be argued that I confuse here a mathematical content with cognitive and social 
activities through which this content is “proceeded”, or with symbolic and linguistic 
forms in which this content is expressed and communicated. It might be further argued 
that once a mathematical content is considered on its own rights hermeneutic issues 
become irrelevant. In the next paragraph I shall show that the latter claim is wrong 
because there are issues, which can be described both as “purely mathematical” and 
hermeneutic. In the present paragraph I shall show that the former claim is problematic 
(even if not plainly false) because a mathematical content cannot be easily separated from 
its symbolic form in a way making this form mathematically irrelevant.   
Consider Pythagorean theorem.   As formulated in (Lang&Murrow 1997, p.95) the 
theorem says this:  
 
(LM) Let  XYZ  be a right triangle with legs of lengths x and y, and hypotenuse of length 
z. Then x2 + y2 =z2.   
 
(Doneddu 1965, p.209) under the title Pythagorean theorem states the following (my 
translation from French): 
 
(D) Two non-zero vectors x and y are orthogonal if and only if  (y- x)2 = y2 + x2. 
 
Finally the famous proposition 47 of Book 1 of Euclid’s Elements states this (hereafter I 
quote Euclid by Heath’s translation (1926):  
 
(E) In right-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the right angle is equal to 
the squares on the sides containing the right angle.  
 
Are (LM), (D) and (E) different forms of the same theorem? An attentive reader will 
immediately answer in negative pointing to the fact that (D) comprises the proposition 
usually called the converse of the Pythagorean theorem. This Donnedu’s terminological 
decision I leave without commenting but ask the same question exchanging (D) for its 
only if part (which I denote (D’) for further references). Now a plausible answer is Yes, of 
course! However obvious might be the answer, particularly in a mathematician’s eyes, 
let’s make some basic hermeneutics about (LM), (D’), (E) and read these propositions 
carefully before making a decision. Obviously each of the three propositions can be 
correctly interpreted only within a larger theory. Fortunately all the three books, from 
which I took the quotations, are elementary textbooks and so require no or very little 
previous mathematical knowledge. So in each of the three cases it is quite clear what is 
the corresponding larger theory. To simplify my task I shall leave out almost everything 
concerning proofs of the theorems and discuss only their statements.  
Lang&Murrow in their book for beginners provide a fairly minimalist conceptual basis 
for their version of the Pythagorean theorem: before learning the theorem a student is 
supposed only to habituate him- or herself to basic geometrical constructions like 
triangles and learn the notion of length of a given straight segment. The latter notion 
reduces in the Lang&Murrow’s book to the notion of distance between two given points. 
Lang&Murrow introduce the notion of distance through informally stated axioms of 
metric space and occasionally mention that distances are numbers one reads off from a 
graduated ruler. What a smart kid should think given two different rulers one of which is 
graduated in inches and the other in centimetres? The unwillingness of the authors to 
elaborate on this point is understandable since they commit themselves to keeping the 
Pythagorean Secret (not to be confused with the Pythagorean theorem) out of the reach of 
their students. I mean the incommensurability problem. Following the teaching strategy, 
which the legend attributes to Pythagoras himself, Lang&Murrow like most of authors of 
today’s elementary mathematical textbooks reserve the truth about incommensurability 
for those of older students who choose to study mathematics at an advanced level and are   
expected not only to see the problem but also treat it by a modern remedy.  
(Doneddu 1965) shows how the remedy may look like. This textbook applies Bourbaki’s 
“architectonic” principles: it starts with making up a Boolean set-theoretic framework, 
then develops on this basis a theory of real numbers, and only after that comes to 
geometrical issues. Euclidean space is construed here as a vector space over the field of 
the reals.  Formula   
(y- x)2 = y2 + x2  
requires an accurate interpretation: the minus sign on the left denotes the subtraction of 
vectors while the plus sign on the right denotes the sum of real numbers (so the two signs 
do not denote here reciprocal operations); the squares on both sides stand for the scalar 
product of vectors. We see that the price of the rigor is quite high: Donnedu’s version of 
Pythagorean theorem requires a much more serious preparatory work, and after all the 
theorem doesn’t explicitly refer to any triangle at all!  
Euclid’s classical presentation of the Pythagorean theorem depends, of course, on 
principles laid out in the beginning of the first book of the Elements. An extended 
historical comment on this theorem wouldn’t be appropriate here, so I shall stress only 
one point often presenting a difficulty for a modern reader. (E) says that the bigger square 
equals to the smaller squares. How to understand this? An interpretation that immediately 
comes to mind is this: the area of the bigger square equals the sum of the areas of the 
smaller squares. But this is certainly not what Euclid says. Euclid speaks here about 
equality of figures, not about equality of their areas. In spite of differences between 
Euclid’s and Hilbert’s axiomatic methods (stressed in what follows), it is helpful to think 
about Euclid's notion of equality as formally introduced through Axioms of the first Book 
of the Elements. The Axioms give this: (i) equality is symmetric and transitive (Axiom 1; 
symmetry of this relation is granted by the linguistic form, in which the Axioms are 
expressed); (ii) congruent figures are equal (Axiom 4); (iii) figures composable of equal 
figures or complementable to equal figures, are equal (Axioms 2,3).  This accounts for 
Euclid’s equality as a binary relation, so (E) saying that one square equals to two other 
squares still remains puzzling. The obvious solution of the puzzle is this: the union of the 
two smaller squares is one relatum here while the bigger square is the other. Applying 
(iii) to the (topologically disconnected) union of two squares and using other Axioms and 
a number of preceding theorems Euclid proves his version of  Pythagorean theorem. The 
equality of areas, of course, implies the Euclidean equality just explained. The converse, 
however, doesn’t always hold. It doesn’t hold, for example, for circles: given two smaller 
circles such that the sum of their areas is equal to the area of a bigger circle the bigger 
circle is obviously not equal in the Euclidean sense to the two smaller circles. A less 
trivial mathematical fact is that polyhedra of the equal volume are, generally speaking, 
not equal in the Euclid’s sense either.  
This short exposition of (LM), (D’) and (E) is by far sufficient for claiming the obvious: 
although there is a sense in which all the three propositions express the “same theorem”, 
the differences between them are anything but merely linguistic. So the claim that the 
three propositions say “essentially the same thing” shouldn’t be taken at its face value. 
One who seeks to sweep the issue of interpretation out of mathematics might take a 
different strategy and argue that, say, only (D’) represents the Pythagorean theorem in its 
correct form while (E) is hopelessly outdated and (LM) is just a simplified account for 
kids. Then it may be argued that the problem of translation between (LM), (D’) and (E) 
belongs to history of mathematics and to mathematics education rather than to pure 
mathematics. It is obvious however that (LM), (D’) and (E) are called by the same name 
of the Pythagorean theorem not for purely historical reason but because of similarity of 
their mathematical contents. How to grasp this similarity in rigorous terms? How the 
claim that given mathematical propositions A, B “say essentially the same thing” can be 
possibly justified?  
In order to answer these questions consider first the notion of logical equivalence. May 
one generally look at logically equivalent mathematical propositions A, B (i.e. 
propositions which imply each other) as different expressions of the same mathematical 
fact? Obviously not. Equivalent mathematical propositions may “mean” very different 
things, so the equivalence of two given mathematical propositions may be very far from 
being obvious. For example in the traditional Euclidean setting the theorem saying that 
the sum of internal angles of any triangle is equal to two right angles is equivalent to the 
to the Fifth Postulate (“Axiom of Parallels”).  But this cannot be seen immediately 
without a proof because the two propositions mean quite different things. So the logical 
equivalence is not sufficient for the purpose. But is it necessary? Given that A, B are 
different formulations of the “same theorem” is it always the case that A, B are logically 
equivalent (in symbols A⇔B)? This might sound like a reasonable requirement but 
looking at our example of Pythagorean theorem one would wish to relax it. For one 
cannot assert and moreover prove A⇔B unless A, B belong to the same theory. But our 
(LM), (D’), (E) all belong to different theories! Let’s see whether the wanted background 
theory C can be acquired. Obviously C should incorporate not only propositions (LM), 
(D’), (E) but also their corresponding mother theories or at least relevant fragments of 
these theories. Although some bricolage of this sort can be certainly made (school 
geometry textbooks provide many such examples) a coherent theory systematically 
combining Bourbaki's setting with Euclid’s (in its original form) can be hardly imagined. 
Instead of combining theories treating differently the “same subject”  (in a sense that we 
are still looking to define) one may rather interpret these theories in each other’s term. 
Let’s see how this works in the given example.  
(E) translates into (LM) through replacement of squares constructed on sides of a given 
triangle by squares of lengths of these sides, and replacement of Euclidean equality 
explained above by equality of real numbers. As far as (E) and (LM) are considered in 
isolation from their mother theories this translation may be viewed as reversible. Clearly 
this is the existence of such translations (I leave translations of (D') into (E) and (LM) to 
the reader) that allows one to speak of similarity or identity of contents of different 
formulations of Pythagorean theorem. As far as these translations are well accounted for 
the problem of identity of contents or "meanings" can be sorted out through a reasonable 
convention. However such a convention cannot be reasonably made ad hoc, so one needs 
a general theory of translation between mathematical theories.  
One might argue that formal axiomatic method reinforced by symbolic logic and Model 
theory provide what is wanted here. This method relies onto an assumption that theories 
allowing for mutual term-wise reversible translations are essentially the same and can be 
reduced to a single "formal" theory. So the formal method provides at least a sufficient 
condition of "essential sameness" of mathematical theories. However this condition is too 
strong to be useful in the case of Pythagorean theorem and other similar cases. Although 
the aforementioned method of translation of (E) into (LM) can be applied in wider 
contexts (in particular to propositions of Book 2 of Elements) it doesn't apply to the 
whole of Elements and doesn't respect its deductive structure. So the suggested 
translation doesn't make Euclid's and Lang&Murrow's accounts into two isomorphic 
models of the same formal theory. As far as mother theories of (E) and (LM) are taken 
into consideration (as they should be) the suggested translation doesn't look like 
isomorphism any longer. Although Model theory allows for more involved relationships 
between models than isomorphism the very notion of model assumes a notion of formal 
theory (that a model in question is a model of). But as our example clearly demonstrates 
one can have a sound notion of translation between non-formalised theories. Moreover it 
seems reasonable to consider formalisation as a translation of a special kind. So formal 
method and Model theory can hardly replace a theory of mathematical translation (which 
can be also called a theory of mathematical hermeneutic) we are looking for.  
In what follows I shall argue that the wanted theory is Category theory.    
 
b) The rise of interpretative mathematics 
Hermeneutic issues about mathematics discussed in the previous paragraph involved 
historical and educational dimensions. Now I shall show how the notion of interpretation 
got involved in mathematics in a more abstract manner and so became “purely 
mathematical”. The term “interpretation” appears in the title of Beltrami’s paper of 1868 
Saggio di interpetrazione della geometria non-euclidea which in eyes of many first 
showed that non-Euclidean geometry was something real. However it seems appropriate 
to start the history of interpretation as a mathematical concept not with this Beltrami's 
paper but from Gauss' geometrical work of 1820-ies (making a reasonable distinction 
between history and corresponding prehistory). Interestingly (but perhaps not so 
surprisingly) interpretation became a genuine mathematical issue during the same period 
of time and in the same part of Europe where and when Schleiermacher, Dilthey and their 
followers stressed the role of interpretation in humanities. Let me recall the story.  
Lobachevsky discovered the non-Euclidean geometry presently called by his name 
through “playing with axioms”, namely through replacement of Euclid’s Fifth Postulate 
(“Axiom of Parallels”) by its negation. Like his numerous Ancient and Modern 
predecessors Lobachevsky hoped to get a contradiction and hence a proof of the 
Postulate. However like Bolyai and few other people working on the problem around the 
same time Lobachevsky at certain point changed his attitude and came to the conviction 
that he explored a new vast territory rather than approached the desired dead end. He 
called this new geometry Imaginary (Lobachevsky 1837) because of the speculative 
character of his enterprise and probably as a precaution: if his theory would turn after all 
to be contradictory he would win anyway getting the wanted proof.  
While Lobachevsky made his discoveries following a traditional line of research Gauss 
got a totally different insight on the problem. Although Gauss’ name hardly needs an 
additional promotion in the history of mathematics, I claim that his role in the discovery 
of non-Euclidean geometries is often misinterpreted and underestimated (like in Bonola 
1908). After reading Bolyai’s paper (1832) Gauss claimed that he found for himself 
nothing new in it, and this claim is at least partly confirmed by existing evidences. He 
made then a controversial remark that “to prise it (the Bolyai’s paper - AR) would mean 
to prise himself” (Bonola 1908). Historians often explain this Gauss’ reluctance by 
personal and sociological reasons or by his alleged epistemological conservatism. I think 
that Gauss’ cautious attitude to Bolyai’s and Lobachevsky’s results doesn’t need such 
non-mathematical explanations. Gauss didn’t accept the notion of geometry as a 
speculation but considered it as an empirical science. For this reason he was very 
sceptical about the whole line of research that led to Lobachevsky’s discoveries (known 
at the time as the “theory of parallels”). This Gauss’ attitude had nothing to do with 
conservatism: on the contrary, in Gauss’ eyes the theory of parallels was too traditional 
and missed really new ideas1. From the today’s historical distance it is easier to argue that 
Gauss was perfectly right, and that his insights later spelled out by Riemann played more 
important role in the change of views on space it time occurred in the 19-20-th century 
than the whole story about the Fifth Postulate. However one had to be a mathematician of 
the rang of H.Weyl to see this clearly already in 1918: 
 
“The question of the validity of the “fifth postulate”, on which historical development 
started its attack on Euclid, seems to us nowadays to be a somewhat accidental point of 
departure. The knowledge that was necessary to take us beyond the Euclidean view was, 
in our opinion, revealed by Riemann.” 
 
Given that Riemann’s concept of manifold provides the mathematical basis of the today’s 
                                                
1« In der Theorie der Parallellinien sind wir jetzt noch nicht weiter als Euklid war. Diess ist die partie 
honteuse der Mathematik die frue oder spaet eine ganz andere Gestalt becommen muss .» Werke v.8, 
166. This is written in 1813, that is, before Bolyai's and Lobachevsky's works were published. But I 
believe that Gauss didn't find the new Gestalt he was looking for neither in Bilyai nor in Lobachevsky.  
best theory (or theories) of space and time, and so replaces in this role Euclidean space of 
Classical mechanics, Weyl’s point is hardly disputable. That Riemann’s geometrical 
works are directly based on Gauss’ is not disputable either. What makes it difficult for a 
part of historians to appreciate Gauss’ and Riemann’s contribution is apparently the fact 
that the mathematical work of these people doesn’t fit the popular story about 
liberalisation of mathematical thought from its alleged stickiness to everyday spatial 
experience by Lobachevsky. Riemannian geometry just like Euclidean geometry about 
two and a half millennia earlier has been first sketched on the ground by Gauss and only 
after that worked out in a more abstract form by Riemann and successfully applied by 
Einstein to Heavens. What triggered this whole development was a new attentive look at 
the space we live in rather than a mere play of imagination or an abstract mathematical 
speculation. 
In 1818-1832 Gauss was busy with what geometry used to be in its early age and later got 
a different name of geodesy. He started with the obvious observation that the hilly terrain 
of Hanover was not Euclidean plane. He also saw that that the current physical 
hypothesis according to which the Kingdom of Hanover together with its mother planet 
float in the infinite Euclidean space was not particularly helpful for geodesic purposes. So 
he looked for different geometrical models. This led him to the theory of curved surfaces 
that he presented in his Disquitiones generales circa superficies curva published in 1827. 
There are firm evidences that Gauss saw connections between non-Euclidean (or anti-
Euclidean as he himself called it) geometry obtained through playing with axioms and 
the geometry of curved surfaces he was working on. Gauss rightly guessed that the latter 
leads to a more fundamental generalisation of the notion of space than the former.  
The key Gauss’ idea that allowed for this generalisation was the idea of intrinsic 
geometry of a given surface. Abbott’s popular Flatland (first edition 1884) explains the 
idea but oversimplifies the general situation: really interesting things happen when one 
considers living on a curved surface rather than in the Flatland, for example on a sphere 
like our globe. Abbott seems to suggest to the reader the following moral: just like 3D 
creatures like ourselves are in a position to observe things going on a plane from a 
“higher viewpoint” and perform tasks impossible on the plane (like escaping from a plane 
prison) a creature living in a space of 4 or more dimensions would find herself in a 
similar position with respect to us ordinary humans. Abbott might believe that this higher 
viewpoint could be achieved through doing mathematics. But this moral is hardly 
justified mathematically. However fascinating the idea of 4D space might be the intuition 
that rising of dimension always allows for solving problems in lower dimensions is quite 
misleading. Given a geometrical problem on a plane switching to 3D space is rarely 
helpful. The idea of “intrinsic viewpoint” obtained through lowering the dimension is 
much more profound, and as a matter of fact it played a far more important role in 
mathematics of late 19-th and the whole of 20-th century.  
The possibility of purely intrinsic description of a surface leads to a generalisation of the 
Euclidean notion of space, that is, to non-Euclidean geometries: only in the special case 
when the given surface is flat its intrinsic geometry is Euclidean. Riemann in (1854) 
sketched this new notion of space and called the new concept by the term manifold 
occasionally used before by Gauss. A Riemannian manifold is a n-dimensional analogue 
of a curved surface seen intrinsically. The talk of a curved space, which became 
colloquial after Einstein, refers to the concept of Riemannian manifold.  
Let’s now return to Beltrami. This man like Gauss started his research in geometry with 
geodesy. He knew Gauss’ results in this domain and tried to elaborate on them. 
Beltrami’s geometrical discoveries originated from the classical cartographic problem: 
How to make a plane map of a curved surface? More specifically Beltrami asked the 
following question:  How to map a curved surface onto a plane in such a way that the 
mapping is one-to-one on points and geodesic lines on the surface go to straight lines on 
the plane? (A geodesic is a line that marks the shortest path between its close points; 
geodesics on a plane are straight lines. So the notion of geodesic generalises upon that of 
a straight line for the case of curved surfaces. The notion of geodesic is intrinsic: 
distances of paths between points of a surface don’t depend on how the surface is 
embedded into an outer space.)  Here is first important result obtained by Beltrami: such 
a mapping is not possible unless the curvature of the surface in question is constant. (The 
curvature is a basic local intrinsic property of a given surface, which shows how much 
the surface is curved around a given point; the concept is due to Gauss.) Hence 
Beltrami’s interest to surfaces of constant curvature (a sphere is an obvious non-trivial 
example) - the issue which had been already studied before Beltrami by another Gauss’ 
follower Minding. In 1866 Beltrami read (Lobachevsky 1840) in French translation 
recently published by Beltrami’s long-term collaborator Houel. This led Beltrami to his 
main discovery presented in his Saggio: mapping geodesics of a surface of constant 
negative curvature (which Beltrami called a pseudo-sphere) to straight lines of a plane 
one gets the Lobachevskian “imaginary” but not the “real” Euclidean geometry. 
Beltrami’s understanding of this result was this: Lobachevsky’s “imaginary plane” is in 
fact nothing but a pseudo-sphere!  
Saggio was impressive but had two serious flaws. First, Beltrami didn't notice that his 
model was only partial: it allowed to think of finite segments of geodesics of pseudo-
sphere as of segments Lobachevskian straight lines but didn't represent the whole lines. 
This fact has been noticed by Helmholz and Klein soon after Beltrami's publication. In 
(1901) Hilbert showed that the difficulty couldn't be overcame through replacing the 
pseudo-sphere by another surface. The other flaw of the Saggio is stressed by Beltrami’s 
himself in the end of this work: the suggested interpretation of Lobachevskian planimetry 
doesn’t generalise to the 3D case. For that reason Beltrami at certain point called the 
Lobachevskian stereometry a “geometrical hallucination”. The need of very different 
treatment of 2D and 3D cases made Beltrami to suspect that something went wrong. 
After reading Riemann’s Habilitaetsvortrag Beltrami found what he now thought was a 
better answer to the question "What is Lobachevskian space?": this is in fact a 
Riemannian manifold of constant negative curvature. This latter answer holds for any 
number of dimensions.  
From an epistemological viewpoint the story just told is very unusual. A classical model 
of science outlined in Aristotle's Analytica Posteriora requires first to fix a subject matter 
of study, then study it and organise results of the study into a theory. It is assumed that 
the study reveals earlier unknown features of the subject matter but doesn't replace it by 
something else. In the case of mathematics this subject matter could be understood as 
figure, number, conic sections, space or something more specific. But the Lobachevsky-
Beltrami's case turned this traditional epistemological scheme upside down. Lobachevsky 
came up with an "imaginary" mathematical theory, which didn't have any clear subject 
matter but was too good to be simply abandoned. Beltrami looked for an appropriate 
subject matter for this theory and found at second attempt a satisfactory answer. At this 
point the talk of interpretation apparently became redundant and the story about a theory 
looking for its subject could be classified as a historical curiosity. However at the time 
there were other reasons to take the idea of freedom of interpretation in mathematics 
seriously. An earlier example of interpretation, which Beltrami mentions in Saggio, is the 
representation of complex numbers as points of Euclidean plane. Another important 
example, which later motivated Hilbert, is the duality principle in Projective geometry. 
The history of this latter geometrical discipline is closely connected to the history of non-
Euclidean geometries outlined above but I shall not explore it here and only briefly 
mention the history of the duality principle. As it has been first noticed by Poncelet in 
1822 given a theorem of Projective geometry one may get another theorem formally 
exchanging words “points” and words “straight lines”. So points can be "interpreted as" 
straight lines and straight lines as points without changing the theory. Gergonne called 
this phenomenon duality and Steiner made it into foundations of Projective geometry (for 
a detailed historical account see Kline 1972, pp. 845-46).  
In spite of its striking new features revealed in 19-th century the notion of mathematical 
interpretation was not entirely new. One may even argue that it was known in 
mathematics since its early history. For centuries mathematicians used to represent some 
objects by other objects and substitute symbols for other symbols looking for invariants 
of such operations. This is what the whole discipline of algebra is about: algebraic 
variables take different values leaving the form of a given algebraic expression invariant. 
In Antiquity mathematicians used to represent (natural) numbers by geometrical objects 
(think about Pythagorean figured numbers, see Heath   1965, v.1) and in Modern times 
they learnt to represent geometrical objects (points) by numbers. In both cases it is 
assumed that a given represented object remains invariant under exchanges of 
representations. It may be further argued that the idea of invariance through 
representations is fundamental for the very notion of mathematical object: for example, a 
circle (a mathematical object) may be thought of as an invariant of any series of 
exchanges of material objects (drawings and the like), which are told to represent the 
mathematical circle. This view has been thoroughly spelled out by Plato who in fact 
suggested a more elaborated theory according to which mathematical objects in their turn 
represent (are images of) things of yet another sort he called ideas. One may also tell a 
plausible story about representation of counted material objects (say, caws) first by other 
material objects like pebbles, which are better manageable, then by written symbols and 
finally by abstract mathematical units. Although this story assumes the order of 
representation which is opposite to Plato's, the idea that the interface between the 
material and the mathematical worlds can be described in terms of representation remains 
unchanged.  
Let me now stress the principle point of this paper. Although the older notions of 
representation and substitution (and the related notion of invariance through substitution), 
on the one hand, and the notion of interpretation as it emerged in the geometry of the late 
19-th century, on the other hand, had indeed much in common the latter does not reduce 
to the former (while the former indeed reduces to the later). I claim that this fact has been 
only partly recognised in the end of 19-th - the beginning of 20-th century by Hilbert and 
other people who treated the new situation along the traditional pattern mentioned above. 
So my task is now to explore possibilities left out by this mainstream development.  
 
2.  Foundations 
a) Elements and Grundlagen 
We have seen that the non-Euclidean geometry emerged in 19-th century had two well 
distinguishable sources. The first is the traditional line of research aiming at proving the 
Fifth Postulate through drawing a contradiction from its negation. This line of research 
started in Antiquity and resulted into Bolyai and Lobachevsky’s works. The second line 
started with Gauss’ geodesic work and led to the notions of intrinsic geometry and 
Riemannian manifold. Beltrami brought the two lines together showing that 
Lobachevskian spaces are Riemannian manifolds of a particular sort. However the 
question of foundations of the new geometry remained open. Obviously neither Euclid’s 
Elements in its original version nor the generalised version of Euclid’s system proposed 
by Bolyai (his absolute geometry) could serve this purpose. Taken seriously the problem 
of foundations of geometry in the end of 19-th century would have to account not only 
for the Riemannian geometry in its full generality but also (at least) for projective 
geometry and topology. Klein  (1893) made a substantial progress toward a theoretical 
unification of geometry developing various links between these disciplines but he didn’t 
produce anything like a replacement of Euclid’s Elements. Hilbert’s Grundlagen first 
published in 1899 partly meets this challenge.  
I say “partly” because in this work Hilbert accounts only for a very limited part of his 
contemporary geometry. Basically the Grundlagen shows how the Euclidean geometry 
looks like in a new context including Lobachevskian geometry and some other 
geometries obtained through "playing with axioms" of Euclidean geometry. Grundlagen 
provides an effective framework and non-trivial examples of such a logico-mathematical 
game and treats related logical issues of consistency and independence of axioms. So the 
Grundlagen continues the traditional Euclidean-Lobachevskian line and doesn’t touch 
upon the Riemannian viewpoint. Hilbert's work became highly influential because of its 
method, viz. Hilbert’s axiomatic method, not because of its content. Hilbert believed that 
using this method one might build appropriate foundations of the whole of mathematics 
and of other sciences. Veblen (1904) and many other people enthusiastically followed 
this idea. (For the history of Hilbert's Grundlagen see Toepell 1986). 
As it is often happens with projects aiming at reform of the whole system of human 
knowledge Hilbert’s project of axiomatisation of mathematics and sciences brought 
controversial results. On the one hand, nothing like an effective global axiomatisation of 
mathematics, and moreover of natural sciences, has been ever achieved. On the other 
hand, Hilbert’s Grundlagen remains a paradigm of a “reasonably formal” (as opposed to 
“purely formal”) axiomatic system in eyes of the majority of working mathematicians. A 
today’s student of mathematics may easily think - and read in many textbooks - that the 
axiomatic method as it is presented in the Grundlagen is just a more rigorous version of 
the method first used by Euclid in his Elements. In this paragraph I shall try to show that 
this view is misleading, and stress a specific character of Hilbert's axiomatic method 
against that of Euclid. For this end let me briefly compare few first pages of the Elements 
and the Grundlagen. 
Euclid starts with his famous definition of point while Hilbert assumes primitive notions 
of point, straight line and plane without trying to define them. There are two closely 
related but still different reasons why Hilbert does this. The first is Hilbert's 
epistemological holism: he assumes that (1a) unless a theory (or at least its axiomatic 
basis) is wholly given these basic concepts cannot be adequately conceived and moreover 
that (1b) an adequate conception of these concepts can be provided by axioms alone 
(without help of definitions). My point is that this holistic view is not incompatible with 
Euclid's Elements, and so not specific for Hilbert's approach. There is no reason to 
assume (as apparently did Hilbert) that Euclid's definition of point as "having no parts" is 
supposed to provide a full grasp of the concept. Euclid might grant (1a) and think of his 
definition of point as nothing but useful hint. (This interpretation is supported by what 
Aristotle says about definitions in his Analytica Posteriora.) Although (1b) is far more 
controversial Euclid might still agree that there is a special sense in which the definition 
of point given in Elements is redundant.  
The other reason why Hilbert leaves points and lines undefined is more involved. It 
becomes clear from the following passage where Hilbert explains his method in the 
nutshell to Frege: 
 
"... surely it is self-evident that every theory is merely a framework or schema of 
concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that basic elements 
can be construed as one pleases. If I think of my points as some system or other of things, 
e.g. the system of love, law and chimney sweeps ... and then conceive of all my axioms 
as relations between these things, then my theorems, e.g. the Pythagorean one, will hold 
of these things as well. In other words, each and every theory can always be applied to 
infinitely many systems of basic elements. For one merely has to apply a univocal and 
reversible one-to-one transformation and stipulate that the axioms for the transformed 
things be correspondingly similar. Indeed this is frequently applied, for example in the 
principle of duality, etc." (cit. by Frege 1971, p.13, italic mine). 
 
Since a point is allowed to "be" (or "thought of") a "system of love or of chimney 
sweeps" (or a beer mug according to another popular Hilbert's saying) nothing like 
Euclid's definition of point can be any longer useful. Neither Euclid nor any other 
mathematician before Hilbert could agree that in geometry "basic elements can be 
construed as one pleases"! (Frege didn't agree with this either.) Epistemological holism 
(however radical) doesn't imply this view.  But let's see a true mathematical reason 
behind Hilbert's colourful rhetoric. Notice Hilbert's reference to the duality principle in 
Projective geometry. What Hilbert aims at here is the following: to construe a 
mathematical theory leaving its interpretation free, that is, to construe it "up to 
interpretation".  
This also explains the second difference, which hits the eye when one compares first 
pages of Elements and Grundlagen. After giving basic definitions and before coming to 
axioms Euclid lists five Postulates while in Hilbert’s work there are no such things at all. 
Although the Grundlagen is not the first introductory text in geometry written after 
Elements without making use of postulates the absence of postulates or their analogues in 
Grundlagen is remarkable. Let me now explain what are Euclidean postulates. Consider 
the first three Postulates of the Elements: 
 
1.to draw a straight line from any point to any point 
2. produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line 
3. describe a circle with any centre and distance  
 
and observe that unlike axioms Postulates 1-3 are not propositions about geometrical 
objects but descriptions of certain operations performed with geometrical objects. Unlike 
Grundlagen Elements is a system of constructions generated by a set of elementary 
operations described by the Postulates 1-3 (that is, constructions by the ruler and the 
compasses) and a system of propositions associated with these constructions. (Proclus in 
his Commentarium analyses the distinction between the two aspects of the theory of the 
Elements in terms of the Platonic ontological distinction between Becoming and Being: 
geometrical objects are treated by Euclid both qua constructed (generated) and qua pre-
existing entities. But one doesn’t need to buy the Platonic metaphysics to recognise the 
distinction.) So the view on Elements as a system of propositions obtained through a 
logical inference from a system of basic propositions called axioms is plainly wrong. 
Whether or not the theory of Elements can be reasonably reformulated as such a system 
of propositions is a different issue, which I leave aside. Elements doesn't fit the above 
description not because it is somewhat "imperfect" but simply because Euclid's project is 
different. But Grundlagen is supposed to fit this description indeed. What in the case of 
Grundlagen replaces postulates in their function of giving a "flesh" to geometrical 
construction is the assumption that, anachronistically speaking, the theory of Grundlagen 
may have a model. However Grundlagen doesn't provide by itself any special means of 
building such a model. Nothing like Euclid's Postulates 1-3 could be appropriate in 
Grundlagen where the interpretation of a given geometrical theory is supposed to be left 
free. 
We see that Hilbert's idea of construing mathematical theories "up to interpretation" 
meets indeed in a certain way the challenge of "interpretative mathematics" of 19-th 
century. Let me now explain why I consider Hilbert's approach as traditional in spite of 
its strikingly new features. The subject matter of the traditional mathematics can be 
described in an Aristotelian vein through distinguishing certain properties of material 
objects called mathematical properties (like shape) and ruling out non-mathematical 
properties like colour. A mathematician is allowed to use material objects in his or her 
work, and even make some mathematical use of non-mathematical properties  (think 
about the problem of four colours) but he or she should never confuse these material 
objects with the proper subject matter of a mathematical study. The new kind of 
mathematics invented by Hilbert (called formal mathematics) makes a further step in the 
same direction: it rules out all non-relational properties as irrelevant and allows into its 
proper subject-matter only bare things and bare relations between these things. In 
practice a mathematician may think about these new mathematical things in the usual 
way, call them by usual names and use convenient helpful drawings. But one is also left 
free to use some unusual names and images for it. This becomes is a matter of personal 
taste or, perhaps, of a research skill. In any event names and images don’t count in the 
final result: a ready-made mathematical theory must not depend on traditional 
mathematical notions and on usual intuitions associated with these notions (let alone 
names and pictures) just like it must not depend on the colour of inks used for writing 
mathematical papers. Hilbert's "formal" approach assumes that the same mathematical 
theory can be interpreted through traditional constructions in different ways just like it 
can be written down by different inks. The Grundlagen provide a tentative theory (in fact 
few different theories) with desired unusual properties. Remarkably the subsequent 
development of Hilbert's idea of formal theory at a certain point allowed for a new 
definite answer to question What is subject matter of mathematics? The answer is this: 
mathematics is about sets. It might seem that the key idea of Hilbert's project of "leaving 
interpretation free" rules out a possibility of such a definite answer however this is not the 
case. The new view on the subject matter of mathematics connects to Hilbert's project 
roughly as follows. Hilbert proposes to think about geometrical points and straight lines 
(or other primitive mathematical notions) as abstract "things" forgetting about their 
convenient images. That things in question form sets appears to be a natural and 
technically speaking very useful assumption. Hence the view on Set theory as a "general 
theory of things" relevant to mathematical matters. (The distinction between "things" or 
"urelements" and sets of such things assumed by Cantor has been later largely abandoned 
by Zermelo's suggestion as redundant from a formal viewpoint.) From a historical 
perspective Hilbert's project can be then viewed as aiming at a higher level of 
mathematical abstraction and bringing about a new kind of abstract objects, namely 
abstract sets. It goes without saying that Hilbert is not the only person to be credited for 
this achievement. Anyway the scandalous situation of the end of 19th century when 
mathematics seemed to have loosen its subject matter has been successfully resolved: 
with the notion of abstract set mathematics regained a firm ground.      
Let me now show that this solution is not satisfactory and suggest a remedy. I shall not 
speak about internal problems of set-theoretic foundations widely discussed in the earlier 
literature but challenge the general view according to which a formal foundations is 
appropriate for mathematics.  
 
b) Categoricity and reversibility 
Suppose a formal system S of (uninterpreted) axioms has two different models A, B. The 
formalist viewpoint outlined above suggests to disregard differences between A and B as 
mathematically irrelevant like the difference of colour of two drawn circles. But suppose 
that now the system S is extended by some additional axioms, and that A is a model of 
the extended system S’ but B is not. Since the difference between A and B is now 
grasped by the formal method a formalist must recognise the difference between A and B 
as essential. So in order to be consistent a formalist needs a criterion of the “essential 
sameness” of models independent of their corresponding theories. In the letter quoted 
above Hilbert says clearly what criterion of "essential sameness" of models he has in 
mind: this is isomorphism, i.e. existence of reversible element-wise translation between 
the models. In other words his idea of formal theory is that of a theory construed up to 
isomorphism (of interpretations). But what guaranties that a given theory like that of 
Grundlagen is indeed formal in this sense, i.e. that all its models are in fact isomorphic? 
The desired property has been called by Veblen (1904) categoricity. Beware that this 
term has nothing to do with Category theory.  
When Hilbert first published his Grundlagen he apparently didn't ask this question. He 
did this in the period between publications of the first and the second editions of 
Grundlagen (1899-1903). So in the second edition of Grundlagen published in 1903 
Hilbert tried to safeguard categoricity of his theory by a dubious axiom postulating that 
any model of his theory is maximal in the sense that it is impossible to obtain another 
model of the theory through introducing new elements into it. The existence of such a 
maximum seems to be incompatible with the standard model theory.   
In 20-th century people learnt to be more tolerant to the lack of categoricity. Remind that 
Zermelo-Frenskel axiomatic Set theory (ZF), Peano Arithmetic (PA) and some other 
theories commonly viewed as important turned to be non-categorical. To preclude the 
right of these theories to be qualified as formal on this ground would apparently mean to 
go too far. To save the situation philosophers invented the notion of "intended model", 
that is of model chosen among others on an intuitive basis. Isn't this ironic that such a 
blunt appeal to intuition is made in the core of formal axiomatic method? I agree with F. 
Davey who recently argued that "no-one has ever been able to explain exactly what they 
mean by intended model". (FOM, 13 Oct 2006). Other people question the categoricity 
requirement. R. Lindauer: "Why rule out non-standard models of 1st-order PA? What's 
wrong with having other models? Why should we be making our model-world smaller 
and not larger?" (FOM, 27 Oct 2006). Myself I believe that the lack of categoricity of 
theories like ZF and PA is indeed a serious flaw. At the same time I agree with Lindauer 
and other people who think that the pursuit of categoricity is misleading. These two 
claims might seem to contradict each other but they don't. Instead of pursuing 
categoricity or looking for a philosophical excuse of the lack of categoricity of popular 
formal theories I shall suggest in what follows to use an alternative method of theory-
building.  
I don't consider pointing to the problem of categoricity as a decisive argument against the 
formal method. I think that this problem is in fact quite artificial and originates from what 
I consider to be the principle flaw of the formal method. The flaw is the following. 
Remind the problem Hilbert faced suggesting his formal method: How to formulate a 
mathematical theory leaving its interpretation free? or How to formulate a theory “up to 
interpretation”? Here is Hilbert’s response: such a theory T must be formal, which means 
that its primitive terms (objects and relations) are variables taking their semantic values 
(“meanings”) through interpretations; given such interpretation (model) M one obtains 
another model M’ of the same theory through a one-to-one substitution (exchange) of 
primitive terms. If T is categorical then the substitution of terms allows one to obtain all 
models of this theory from any given model. We see that Hilbert considers reversible 
transformations between models (one-to-one substitutions of terms) as the only kind of 
interpretation he has to cope with. But the notion of interpretation as it has emerged in 
geometry of the 19-th century does not reduce to such reversible interpretations 
(isomorphisms). Interpretations are, generally speaking, non-reversible. A theory 
determined "up to isomorphism" is not a theory determined "up to arbitrary 
interpretation". So Hilbert’s formal method doesn’t resolve the problem posed by the new  
"interpretative mathematics" but in a special case. The lack of a categoricity of workable 
formal systems is, in my view, nothing but a symptom of the latter problem.  
To show that mutual interpretations of mathematical theories are, generally, non-
reversible, let me come back to Beltrami. In terms of Teoria the principle result of Saggio 
can be formulated as follows: a 2-dimensional Riemannian manifold of constant negative 
curvature (= Lobachevskian plane) is embeddable (in fact only locally embeddable) into 
3-dimensional Euclidean space which is another Riemannian manifold. The embedding is 
not reversible: one cannot embed the Euclidean space into the Lobachevskian plane. One 
may remark that we are talking here about a map between spaces (manifolds) but not 
about an interpretation between theories. But it is obvious that however the notion of 
theory is construed in this case the situation remains asymmetric: while Lobachevskian 
plane geometry can (modulo needed reservations) be explained in or "translated into" 
terms of Euclidean 3D geometry the converse is not the case. 
An embedding is a sort of transformation called monomorphism. Carving a pseudosphere 
out of its ambient space one may show indeed that the pseudosphere is isomorphic (in 
fact only locally isomorphic) to the Lobachevskian plane. However this reasoning is 
misleading: in the given context a pseudosphere cannot be carved out from the Euclidean 
space and considered as a self-standing object. For if the pseudosphere is indeed carved 
out from its ambient space and considered as a self-standing space (manifold) it ceases to 
be Euclidean.  
We see that the notion of interpretation in mathematics as it has emerged in geometry of 
the 19-th century doesn’t reduce to the old idea of reversible term-wise substitution of 
values of variables, which has led Hilbert to his formal axiomatic method.  
A similar point can be made about arithmetical models of plane Euclidean and other 
geometries used by Hilbert in Grundlagen. Perhaps one can indeed imagine geometrical 
points as usual dots, "systems of loves" or beer mugs indiscriminately. But representation 
of points by pairs of real numbers (or pairs of elements of another appropriate algebraic 
field) is a different matter. Unlike dots and beer mugs numbers are mathematical objects 
on their own rights belonging to a different mathematical theory, namely Arithmetic. 
"Translations" of geometrical theories into Arithmetic used by Hilbert are evidently non-
reversible: they allow to recast geometrical theories in arithmetic terms but not arithmetic 
theories in geometrical terms. Hilbert certainly saw this. He didn't mean to say that 
Geometry and Arithmetic seen from a higher viewpoint turn to be the same theory (in 
fact he considered a possibility of reduction of one theory to the other but this is a 
different issue). Nevertheless he thought about this translation as an isomorphism, 
namely an isomorphism between basic geometrical objects and relations, one the one 
hand, and specially prepared arithmetical constructions, on the other hand. But such 
constructions obviously cannot be made outside an appropriate arithmetical theory! As 
far as this "target" arithmetical theory is wholly taken into consideration the translation in 
question doesn't look like an isomorphism any longer. We see that the example of 
projective duality mentioned by Hilbert (to leave alone the "system of love, law and 
chimney sweeps") is special and cannot be used for treating the notion of interpretation in 
mathematics in the general case.   
Let me now suggest how the "hermeneutic challenge" can be more effectively met. 
  
c) Forms and Categories 
The concept of Riemannian manifold like many other mathematical concepts allows for a 
corresponding notion of map or transformation (between different items falling under the 
given concept). It is obtained as a straightforward generalisation of the notion of 
isomorphism of manifolds through giving up the reversibility condition. Maps between 
Riemannian manifolds are differentiable transformations. Think about these maps as 
usual maps in cartography. So they can be conceived as "interpretations" of manifolds in 
terms of other manifolds. Describing the concept of Riemannian manifold "up to 
interpretation" amounts to construing the manifolds together with all maps between them. 
A structure of this sort is called a category. The notion of category introduced by 
Eilenberg and MacLane in (1945) is very weak: one requires only an operation of 
composition of transformations between the objects, the associativity of this composition 
and the existence of an identity transformation for each object. Transformations of 
objects are called in the Category theory morphisms. These requirements are obviously 
satisfied by Riemannian manifolds and differentiable transformations. Other standard 
examples include sets and functions, groups and group homomorphism, topological 
spaces and continuous transformations, etc. A shall denote the category of Riemannian 
manifolds RM for further references.  
The notion of category can be apparently thought of as a very general form of 
mathematical concepts. This might seem natural but in fact is quite misleading. For the 
notion of form can be described as invariant of a group of isomorphisms between objects 
of a given class which are told to have the "same form". More precisely a form is what 
one gets through identification of isomorphic objects.  Think about Euclidean circles and 
usual geometrical transformations between the circles like motions and scalings. Such 
transformation are reversible, otherwise they wouldn't form a group. Changing the chosen 
class of transformations one changes the corresponding notion o form. For example 
through allowing for all reversible continuous transformations between circles one 
obtains the topological notion of circle (a "topological form"), which differs from the 
convenient metrical notion of circle (in particular the former unlike the later doesn't 
distinguish between circles and ovals). The suggested definition equally fits the 
colloquial notion of algebraic form: the isomorphisms associated with algebraic forms are 
substitutions of variables. It also fits the traditional Platonic conception of natural 
numbers as forms: think about bijections between finite sets.  
Now if one think of the abstract notion of category, on the one hand, and independently 
construed mathematical objects (manifolds, groups, sets, etc) with their associated maps, 
on the other hand, one may think of substitutions of abstract categorial objects and 
morphisms by "concrete" manifolds and differentiable transformations, groups and group 
homomorphisms, sets and functions, etc. However these substitutions are not reversible 
because the categories in question are not isomorphic! This can be seen clearly through 
the standard construal of manifolds, groups, topological spaces, etc. as "structured sets"; 
in this case morphisms between manifolds, groups, etc. can be described as maps 
between base sets preserving corresponding structures. As far as these structures are 
different the   morphisms are different too. So the abstract notion of category cannot be 
thought of in terms of reversible substitutions of abstract objects and abstract morphisms 
by some "concrete" terms. Hence an abstract category is not a form in the sense of the 
above definition.  
Although different categories don't share anything like a common form they can be 
linked (or “transformed into each other” or “interpreted in each other's terms”) by 
appropriate morphisms, which in this context are called functors. So different categories 
form various “categories of categories” just like different sets form sets of sets. One may 
even think (as does Lawvere in his 1966) about “the” category of categories albeit this 
risky notion is not necessary for my argument.   
Observe that certain mathematical concepts like the concepts of circle, of singleton, of 
Euclidean plane and many others have this strong property: their instances are all 
isomorphic. I shall call such concepts form-concepts. But there is also a larger class of 
mathematical concepts having a weaker property: their instances make categories. The 
concepts of set, group, manifold, topological space and many others are not form-
concepts but belong to this latter class. I shall call these latter concepts category-
concepts. Form-concepts are category-concepts since a group of isomorphisms associated 
with a form-concept is a category having only one object and such that all its morphisms 
are reversible. But the converse is not the case. Thus a category is not a kind of form 
while a form (in the sense of the above definition) is indeed a kind of category. Remark 
that the concept of category is itself a category-concept while the concept of form is not a 
form concept. I shall not further elaborate here on the general concept of form but suggest 
that it is a category-concept as well.       
The terminology just introduced helps me to formulate more clearly my objection to 
Hilbert's formal approach and make an alternative proposal. Hilbert's idea of "formal" 
theory amounts to conceiving of mathematical theories as form-concepts. (I'm talking 
about particular theories, not about the general concept of theory.) But the analysis given 
in the previous section suggests thinking about mathematical theories as category-
concepts (since mutual interpretations between theories are generally non-reversible!). So 
my proposal amounts to conceiving of a mathematical theory as a category. No analogue 
of the categoricity problem (in Veblen's sense) appears within the category-theoretic 
approach, which I'm going now to explain.   
   
d) Categorical theories and functorial semantics 
The categorical method of theory-building can be roughly described as follows: theories 
and concepts are specified by their categorical properties (rather than by formal 
properties). The idea is this: given a category-concept (like that of manifold, group, etc.) 
to specify an "abstract" category which could be reasonably identified with a 
corresponding "concrete" category obtained through a standard (usually set-theoretic) 
construal of the concept in question and the corresponding notion of map. Observe that 
the usual distinction between abstract and concrete categories just mentioned should be 
abandoned as far as one takes a category-theoretic viewpoint to start with. As far as 
concepts of object and morphism are taken as basic and other mathematical concepts are 
supposed to be reconstructed in their terms there is no reason to call them "abstract".  
For the case of sets such work has been first done in (Lawvere 1964) where the author 
has provided a list of axioms distinguishing the category of sets among other categories. 
The case of category of Riemannian manifold is much more involved, I refer the reader to 
(Kock 1981), (McLarty 1992) and (Bell, forthcoming) for details. Observe that 
categorical approach to building geometrical spaces generalises upon Klein's "Erlangen" 
approach (Klein 1872) through allowing for non-reversible transformations of spaces.  
In fact Lawvere in his early papers (1964) and (1966) refers to the standard formal 
method and presents his proposed theories as first-order formal theories of categories. 
However in his later work (2003) speaking about category-theoretic foundations of 
mathematics Lawvere no longer refers to the formal method and opts for understanding 
of the notion of foundations "in a common-sense way rather than in the speculative way 
of the Bolzano-Frege-Peano-Russell tradition". I find this change of Lawvere's view 
significant and suggest to consider the categorical method of theory building pioneered 
by Lawvere as a genuine alternative to the formal method (rather than as something 
commonsensical). Remark that such categories as the category of (all) sets, all groups, all 
manifolds, etc. cannot possibly have isomorphic copies. For an isomorphic copy of, say,  
"the" category of sets cannot be anything else but another category of sets. But all the sets 
are supposed to be already there in the former category. As far as such a category is 
specified up to isomorphism it turns to be unique. From the formal point of view this is 
the most suspicious and makes one to suggest that notions of categories of "all" objects of 
a given type are illegitimate. This view is defended in (Eilenberg&MacLane1945) on a 
set-theoretic ground. However since then categories of this sort became ubiquitous in 
mathematical practice. In fact the talk of the category of "all" sets and other similar 
categories refers to categorical construals of corresponding concepts (of the concept of 
set and others) making the issue of "size" irrelevant. ("Local smallness" in categories is a 
different issue, which I leave aside.) So it is not surprising that the notion of isomorphism 
of categories turns to be, as Gelfand and Manin's put this, "useless" (2003, p.70) even if 
not illegitimate. This fact provides an additional support to the idea of developing 
categorical methods of theory-building independently of formal methods: unless a class 
of isomorphic models is available the very notion of formal looses its sense.   
Before providing details about categorical methods of theory-building let's discuss what 
we may hope to get. A reasonable task is, for example, to identify a category as the 
category of Riemannian manifolds or as the category of Euclidean spaces. (It goes 
without saying that concepts of Riemannian manifold, Euclidean spaces and other 
mathematical concepts can be conceived in different ways. Speaking about "the" category 
of manifolds, etc. I mean the corresponding category of "all" objects of a given sort 
corresponding to the chosen version of a given concept. I don't mean to rule out the 
possibility that different categories can be called "categories of Riemannian manifold".) 
This is what earlier in this paper I called a construal of a given concept "up to 
interpretation" or "up to arbitrary morphism".  If we now compare this expected result 
with what one gets through application of formal methods we can notice two things. (i) 
Formal methods normally describe what in a corresponding categorical construction is a 
single object (up to isomorphism) like the Euclidean plane. In this sense categorical 
theories (now I mean theories built by category-theoretic methods) are more 
comprehensive than corresponding formal theories. (ii) At the same the category of 
Riemannian manifolds doesn't comprise all arithmetical and other "external" models of 
geometrical spaces allowed from the formal viewpoint. In a categorical framework such 
models can be construed as more specific constructions with functors to other categories. 
So the categorical approach viewed against the formal one not only brings new objects 
under the scope of the same conceptual scheme but also discriminates between models 
formally seen as essentially identical. Thus the categorical approach supports a more 
traditional view according to which, pairs of numbers may represent rather than be 
geometrical points. Remarkably this discrimination is made on a ground which a 
formalist would accept: the two kinds of things are distinguished by their different 
"behaviour" but not by anything like their "intrinsic nature"; although in some special 
contexts points and pairs of numbers may behave similarly in wider contexts taken into 
account by categorical methods these things behave quite differently.  
Let me now point to a categorical method of theory-building suggested in (Lawvere 
1963-2004) and called functorial semantics.  It looks like a simulation of formal 
axiomatic method by categorical means but at the same time it demonstrates essential 
differences. Instead of writing axioms with usual strings of formulae one encodes axioms 
into a special "syntactic" category T that plays the role of "formal theory". Like in the 
case of standard semantics one assumes a "background" semantic category B, which is 
usually taken to be the category of sets but can be chosen differently. Models of T are 
functors of the form f: T-->B. One advantage of this construction is that it allows for 
different notions of model (only functors having certain properties count as models). 
Another remarkable fact is that under rather general conditions T can be embedded into a 
category M(T,B) of its functorial models. This definitely changes the whole idea of 
theory as a structure over and above all its possible models and suggests the view on a 
theory as "generic model" (Lawvere 1963-2004, p.19), which generates other models like 
circles and straight lines generate further constructions in Euclid's Elements. The 
functorial semantics also shows that the requirement of categoricity (in Veblen's sense) is 
as much unrealistic as unreasonable: although "good" categorical properties of M(T,B) 
are desirable there is no good reason to require that this category reduces to a single 
object.   
Remark a different role of logic within formal and the categorical approaches.  The 
formal approach fits the traditional view on logic (dating back to Aristotle) as the most 
general theory of reasoning, or more precisely, of the correct reasoning. In order to build 
a formal theory one “starts with” a system of formal logical calculus, and then writes 
down axioms introducing new non-logical symbols and thinking about their 
interpretations. So the idea of formal axiomatic method implies at least a weak version of 
logicism according to which any mathematical theory is based on (even if not reduces to) 
a certain system of logic.  A categorical reconstruction of mathematical concepts unlike a 
formal reconstruction doesn’t generally start with logic. It starts with the notion of 
category and proceeds with further categorical constructions. Permissible categorical 
constructions can be specified through constructive postulates. Consider this postulate, 
which I deliberately put in the form similar to Euclid's postulates: 
 
Given morphisms A-->B and B-->C to produce morphism A-->C 
 
A notion of logic can be then recaptured through associating a formal logical calculus 
with a category having appropriate "logical" properties (Bunge 1984, Makkai& Reyes 
1977). This gives the notion of internal logic of a category. (As one might expect the 
internal logic of the category of sets is Classical logic.) So the categorical approach 
unlike the formal one is compatible with the view (held by otherwise so different thinkers 
as Boole, Poincaré and Brouwer) that logic assumes certain mathematical principles and 
so cannot be viewed as a basis for mathematics. This latter view on relationships between 
mathematics and logic better copes with the pluralism about logic (Beall&Restall 2000) 
than the logicist view mentioned above.  
Lawvere's functorial semantics has been developed for a special case of algebraic theories 
and so it cannot be immediately used as a method of theory-building applicable in all 
areas of mathematics. Since then a lot of technical work has been done in related fields of 
categorical logic and categorical model theory. Nevertheless the categorical method of 
theory-building remains a work in progress and doesn't exist to the date in a standard 
form. For a historical introduction and further references I refer the reader to (Bell 2005).  
 
3. Reversibility of mathematical reasoning and conceptual development of mathematics 
We have seen that taking into consideration of non-reversible transformations between 
mathematical objects and treating these transformations on equal footing with 
isomorphisms has quite dramatic consequences for mathematics and its philosophy. 
Category theory is the general theory of non-reversible transformations (morphisms). 
Category theory meets the hermeneutic challenge of geometry of the end of 19-th century 
in a far more radical way than Hilbert’s formal method:  it makes morphisms, which can 
be viewed as elementary interpretations, into building blocks of mathematical 
constructions. (The notion of object of a category is in fact redundant: identity morphisms 
are sufficient to make the categorical machinery work properly.) In this section I shall try 
to outline some features of the new notion of mathematics brought about by this 
development.  
Let me first show that considering of non-reversible morphisms on equal footing with 
isomorphisms is less innocent than it might seem. Consider this question: Is the operation 
of addition 7+5-->12 reversible or not? The question can be understood in different 
senses and so given different answers. The operation (+5) can be cancelled (reversed) by 
this subtraction: 12-5-->7, so it is reversible. However given that 12 is obtained as a sum 
of two summands there is no way to find out what these summands are. In this latter 
sense the operation (in fact a different operation) is non-reversible. But yet in a different 
(and perhaps not a “properly mathematical”) sense the latter operation is still reversible: 
when 7 and 5  are summed up and bring 12 the summands 7, 5 don’t perish but survive! 
This allows for writing the usual equality sign instead of arrow: 7+5=12. In this latter 
sense any mathematical operation and any categorical morphism is reversible. This 
suggests thinking of the notions of mathematical operation and transformation as mere 
metaphors describing particular relations between mathematical objects. In this latter 
view when 7 and 5 are summed up “nothing happens” indeed: the story of emergence of 
12 out of 7 and 5 is just a way to say that the three numbers hold a particular ternary 
relation. This way to explain away references to processes and operations in 
mathematical discourses is known at least since Plato and in 20th century it has been 
made again popular by Frege, Russell and their followers. I shall not discuss this Platonic 
view systematically here but only remark that it ceases to be plausible as far as 
mathematics is viewed as a human activity going on in space and time. A computer 
performing the operation 7+5-->12 may keep or not keep the summands in its memory 
after the operation is done. The same is true for humans. One may argue after Plato that 
these facts have nothing do with numbers themselves but I think that the task of 
reconstruction of a notion of number from the relevant conceptual dynamics empirically 
observed in mathematical classrooms and elsewhere is interesting and anyway worth 
trying.  
Observe that if during a mathematical reasoning one forgets where he or she has started 
from this certainly disqualifies the reasoning. So the reversibility is certainly required in 
this case. This basic reversibility of mathematical reasoning is made explicit in the 
Elements where each proposition is repeated twice: immediately before and immediately 
after its proof (but before Q.E.D.) Now granting this basic reversibility one might argue 
that mathematics is ultimately formal while non-reversible mathematical transformations 
are superfluous structures construed on a formal basis. However the argument can be met 
through taking a larger-scale conceptual dynamics into consideration. The larger-scale 
dynamics shows that the reversibility of mathematical reasoning is not so fundamental as 
it seems. At larger temporal (and perhaps also spatial) scales mathematics is obviously 
non-reversible. When Pythagorean theorem is taught in school a teacher may reasonably 
aim at reversibility of all interpretations of this theorem given by different pupils since 
this shows that all the pupils have learnt one and the same thing. (Interestingly, not any 
kind of reversibility is desired in this situation. The merely phonetic reversibility will not 
do: when all the pupils in a class utter the statement of the theorem and its proof in 
exactly the same words the teacher may suspect that none of them in fact understands it.) 
But this standard obviously doesn't apply at historical scales. One can hardly talk about a 
common form of the Pythagorean theorem invariantly preserved since Ancient times to 
today (except the form of the famous diagram known as Bride's Chair, Pythagoras' 
Trousers and a number of different names).  This is moreover true for developed 
mathematical theories. The continuity of development of mathematics can be better 
described in terms of non-reversible interpretations between different fragments of 
mathematics, including historically remote fragments. Quasi-eternal concepts like the 
Pythagorean theorem (or, say, natural number) can be best understood as epiphenomena 
of a continuous non-reversible conceptual dynamics. As the example of the Pythagorean 
theorem clearly shows transformations involved into this dynamics don’t reduce neither 
to isomorphisms (which is obvious for otherwise mathematics couldn’t develop) nor to 
monomorphisms (embeddings) of older contents into new ones. Like any other science 
mathematics not only acquires new knowledge but also constantly revises its older 
contents and throws some of them away. The cumulative model of development of 
science and mathematics is oversimplified even if it allows for occasional “revolutions” 
(Kuhn 1962). In a categorical framework such oversimplified assumptions no longer look 
as “natural”. A categorical analysis makes it clear that to keep a certain branch of science 
(mathematical or not) at the same fixed point of its development is not a trivial task (as 
anybody involved into the educational business knows by experience). I suggest that this 
task is in fact impossible: without new research science and mathematics rapidly corrupt 
but not just cease to develop.   
Thus however fundamental might seem the reversibility of mathematical reasoning, and 
however plausible be the Platonic view on mathematical objects as eternal, a wider 
outlook reveals that in fact these phenomena are local. Assuming the notion of non-
reversible morphism as basic a mathematician is no longer obliged to think of 
mathematics only in terms of its today's slice.  
 
4. Conclusion: Mathematical Structuralism.  
In the philosophy of mathematics of the 20-th century Structuralism has been first 
associated with Bourbaki’s fundamental Les Eléments des mathématiques aiming at 
reconstruction of mathematics in set-theoretic terms. Les Eléments starts with a version of 
Set theory, and then introduce various mathematical concepts as “structured sets”. Take a 
set G and associate with any ordered pair of its elements a third element of the same set; 
an obvious axiomatic description of this construction turns it into a group. In the given 
context the set G can be called a “set equipped with the group structure”. The idea is that 
the “structure” is put here on the top of an arbitrarily chosen “background set”. 
Topological spaces, rings, modules and many other (arguably all) mathematical concepts 
can be construed similarly. A large part of mathematics of the second part of the 20-th 
century has been made in this framework. Bourbaki's colloquial metaphysics resembles 
Aristotle's: mathematical objects are "made of" the same set-theoretic "matter" and 
distinguished by their "forms" (structures).  
Chapter 4 of (Bourbaki 1968) presents a general theory of structures. Here Bourbaki 
distinguishes basic kinds of structures like the final and the initial structures, which don't 
correspond to popular mathematical concepts like that of group or topological space. A 
reader familiar with the Category theory can easily identify them with corresponding 
category-theoretic concepts. So Category theory suggests to improve upon Bourbaki's 
colloquial metaphysics and think of "forms" or "structures" in the abstraction of the set-
theoretic "matter"! Hence the claim that the Category theory provides a further support 
for the Mathematical Structuralism (Awodey 1996, 2004; MacLane 1996), which is the 
view that only structures (but not the "matter") count. 
Here is a recent official definition of mathematical structuralism (Hellman, forthcoming): 
 
“Structuralism is a view about the subject matter of mathematics according to which what 
matters are structural relationships in abstraction from the intrinsic nature of related 
objects.” 
 
Like in the case of Hilbert's Grundlagen I suggest to distinguish carefully between the 
two following features implied by this definition. The first is epistemological (and 
possibly also) ontological holism about mathematical matters: no mathematical object can 
be thought of outside of its relations with other mathematical objects. The second feature, 
which I shall call exchangism, is more specific. It is the assumption of possibility of 
exchanging the relata of a given relation by some other relata, so that the "structural 
relationships" or the "structure" remains invariant. Consider group G construed as just 
described and replace each element of its underlying set by another element of another 
set. This operation obviously doesn't change much: what we get is just another 
isomorphic copy G' of the "same" group. Similarly any model of a given formal theory 
can be replaced by another isomorphic model. Structuralism says that all mathematical 
theories and concepts function in this way.  Hellman quite rightly traces this view back to 
Hilbert's Grundlagen.  
Let's now test the two features of Structuralism against Category theory and the 
prospective categorical method of theory-building suggested above. Categorical approach 
certainly pushes mathematical holism further forward. While the formal approach 
suggests to chose a favourite model of a given formal theory (but keep in mind that this 
model can be exchanged for another isomorphic model) the categorical approach 
suggests working with a whole category of models at once. But the "exchangism" 
generally doesn't apply to Category theory and to prospective categorical mathematics. 
To see this remark that "exchanges" are reversible transformations (think about G and G') 
while categorical morphisms, generally speaking, are not. As I have already argued 
above, the idea that given, say, the category of sets and functions one may exchange sets 
and functions for groups and group homomorphisms, then again for topological spaces 
and continuous transformation, etc., and finally to conceive of an abstract notion of 
category as a structure invariant through such exchanges is plainly wrong. For categories 
just mentioned are not isomorphic (functors between them are not reversible), so there is 
nothing invariant here. So Category theory and categorical mathematics doesn't support 
Mathematical Structuralism or at least the version of Structuralism explicated above.  
Remarkably the categorical approach defended here doesn't rely on anything like 
"intrinsic nature" of mathematical objects either. Moreover it apparently squares well 
with this basic idea behind the structuralist approach: mathematics studies relations 
between things but not things themselves. The notion of mathematical structure has been 
developed as an attempt of thinking "relations without relata" or more precisely "relations 
indifferent to their relata". Considering categorical morphisms as relations (in a broad 
philosophical rather than technical sense) one may argue that Category theory provides 
even better mathematical realisation of this project than Bourbaki's set-theoretic 
machinery. Given that objects in a category are identified with their identity morphisms 
the category is construed out of morphisms ("relations") and nothing else.  
The idea of categorical mathematics, which I defend in this paper, is indeed a further 
development of the idea of structuralist mathematics. But in order to make the difference 
clear I choose not to qualify the categorical approach as structuralist. The talk of 
"structural relationships in abstraction from the intrinsic nature of related objects” clearly 
implies the notion of structure as a form-concept. Trying to generalise this notion to the 
effect of making it into a category-concept one looses anything like its usual 
understanding. Given a class C of isomorphic mathematical objects one may always 
associate with it a new abstract object S conceived as "structure" shared by all members 
of C; then S can be thought of " in abstraction from the intrinsic nature" of members of C. 
This Fregean notion of abstraction seems to be relevant to Hellman's definition of 
Structuralism. But I don't see how this notion of abstraction can be reasonably 
generalised in order to allow for the case of non-reversible morphisms. Given an 
isomorphism A<-->B one may identify A, B  "up to isomorphism" and conceive the result 
of this identification as a new abstract object C. However given a non-reversible 
morphism A-->B one cannot perform anything similar. So the notion of abstract structure 
stipulated over and above all its isomorphic instantiations doesn't survive the suggested 
generalisation.  
The idea of categorical mathematics pushes further forward the anti-essentialist stance of 
Structuralism. From a categorical viewpoint the notion of mathematical structure looks 
like just another kind of "mathematical essence". I can see that structures played and 
continue to play an important role in mathematics but I claim that the structuralist view 
on mathematics as a general science of structures is not adequate to today's mathematics 
and can hardly motivate new mathematical developments. The view on mathematics as a 
general science of categories is much broader (since the notion of category is far more 
general than the notion of structure) and provides mathematicians and philosophers with 
a new perspective yet to be explored.   
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